| 1. |
- Linderfalk, Ulf, et al.
(author)
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Chaps. 1-11, 15
- 2012
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In: Folkrätten i ett nötskal, 2 uppl. - 9789144079134
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)
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| 2. |
- Linderfalk, Ulf
(author)
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All the Things That You Can Do With Jus Cogens: : A Pragmatic Approach to Legal Language
- 2013
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In: German Yearbook of International Law. - 0344-3094. ; 56, s. 351-386
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Investigating the meaning of conceptual terms is an important task for international legal scholars. In the analysis of the usage of conceptual terms in international legal discourse, traditionally, most international lawyers have confined studies to the descriptive meaning of those terms. They have assumed that conceptual terms describe a relationship between, on the one hand, the particular properties identifying a particular phenomenon or state of affairs as one that belongs to the extension of a particular concept, and on the other hand, the legally relevant inferences ensuing from the categorisation. While this theory works reasonably well as long as studies are confined to the meaning of conceptual terms in law, it is ill-suited for any similar study of international legal discourse. In the search for possible alternatives, this article adopts instead a pragmatic approach to legal language. More specifically, it equates the meaning of a conceptual term with its functionality, that is, with what the uttering of a conceptual term potentially does to the beliefs, attitudes, and behaviour of participants in international legal discourse. The investigation proceeds in two steps. As Section II argues, a functionality-based theory of meaning suggests a method (referred to throughout the article as functionality analysis) that can be used for the analysis of international legal discourse. Sections III, IV and V illustrate the ramifications of functionality analysis by applying it relative to the usage of one particular conceptual term, namely jus cogens.
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| 9. |
- Linderfalk, Ulf
(author)
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International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes Tribunal, Spyridon Roussalis v Romania, Decision of 7 December 2011
- 2013
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In: International and Comparative Law Quarterly. - 0020-5893. ; 62:1, s. 241-250
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Abstract in UndeterminedInternational lawyers interested in international investment law and treaty interpretation issues should consider the international award recently delivered by an ICSID Tribunal in the case of Spyridon Roussalis v Romania.1 The case arose out of the privatization of a Romanian warehouse company (SC Malimp SA). On 23 October 1998, another Romanian company (Continent SRL) entered into a share purchase agreement with the Romanian authority for state assets recovery (AVAS) to purchase 372,523 shares in SC Malimp SA, or the equivalent of a 70 per cent interest in the company. Following the acquisition of SC Malimp SA, the name of that company was changed to SC Continent Marine Enterprise SA (or ‘Continent SA’ for short).
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| 10. |
- Linderfalk, Ulf
(author)
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International Legal Hierarchy Revisited: The Status of Obligations Erga Omnes
- 2011
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In: Nordic Journal of International Law. - 0902-7351. ; Vol. 80, s. 1-23
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Increasingly, international legal arguments exploit the peculiar nature of obligations erga omnes. This practice raises questions about the precise legal status of norms expressing such obligations relative to other norms of international law. According to an oft-made suggestion, whether a norm is part of the international jus cogens or not, when it expresses obligations erga omnes it is hierarchically superior to all other norms of non-peremptory international law. This essay inquires into the justification of this theory – throughout the essay referred to as “the Theory on the Superior Status of Erga Omnes Obligations”. As shown in section 2, irrespective of whether inferential legal evidence exists or not, the Theory on the Superior Status of Obligations Erga Omnes can be explained by reference to the non-reciprocal character of such obligations. However, logic requires that the theory be restated to include also interdependent obligations and obligations erga omnes partes. As shown in section 3, although inferential legal evidence provides some support for the Theory on the Superior Status of Obligations Erga Omnes, the evidence is not entirely consistent. As shown in section 4, if the theory on the superior status of obligations erga omnes is adopted and applied on a wide scale, this will have detrimental effects on the overall understanding of international law. Rather than a more properly functioning international legal system, confusion and disorganization will ensue.
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